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FACTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
In its Statement of the Case, Appellee Provo City outlined a few facts that require
additional clarification. Appellee indicates that it took the Utah Supreme Court Ruling in
Provo City v. Ivie uat face value" and decided to condemn the property in question
through Utah County, as if Provo City had decided to follow the directions of the
Supreme Court. In actuality, Provo City had entered into the Interlocal Cooperation
Agreement with Utah County on May 27, 2003 (Record 395), almost 11 months before
the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decision in Provo City v. Ivie. Provo City had
been planning for more than a year to file an additional condemnation action against the
Appellants, thereby demonstrating an understanding of the high probability that the
Supreme Court would rule that Provo City did not have authority to condemn outside the
city limits. Despite understanding the risks, Provo City elected to proceed with lawsuits
on multiple fronts against Appellants.
Provo City asserts that it has acquired the land which is the subject of this
litigation but this allegation is not supported by evidence in the record. The property
condemned by Utah County remains Utah County property, not Provo City's. Section 6
of the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement specifically states that the property condemned
under the Agreement will only become Provo City property once the property "become[s]
situated within CITY's municipal boundaries" or in other words, only when the
condemned property is annexed into Provo City. (Record 443). There has been no
annexation of any of the property in question and therefore, title remains with Utah
County. Provo City has never "obtained possession of the properties at issue."
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Finally, Provo City represents that Utah County v. Ivie held that Provo City could
pursue its case through an Interlocal Cooperative Agreement. In actuality, Utah County
v. Ivie simply affirmed that a county has inherent powers to contract with a city. The
case does not necessarily authorize Utah County and Provo City to enter into an interlocal cooperative agreement, nor did it direct that endeavor.
ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE THIS CASE WILL HAVE LITTLE OR NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE, THE COURT SHOULD FOCUS ON DOING
FAIRNESS TO THE PARTIES.
The facts of this case are unique. It is a rare event that a condemning authority is

found to lack the power to condemn, and it is unprecedented in Utah that multiple
condemning entities have sought the same property. In response to the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Provo City v. Ivie the Utah Legislature wanted to ensure that a
municipality would not be placed in the position of being unable to condemn property
outside its borders for city road construction. Therefore, the Legislature amended UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 10-8-2 so that a municipal authority could condemn both inside and outside

its borders. &e UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-2(l)(d) and 10-8-2(5)(a)(i)(A). These
statutory amendments ensure that the facts of this case can never be repeated. Given the
very limited precedential value this case will have, the Court should focus on rendering
fairness to the parties. Appellants have been forced to bear the burden of two separate
condemnation lawsuits, and have incurred substantial costs and fees in doing so. The
Court should focus on rectifying that injustice to the extent that it can do so.
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II.

CONTRARY TO PROVO CITY'S ASSERTION, UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-3446 IS AMBIGUOUS AND PROVO CITY'S INTERPRETATION
OF THE STATUTE WOULD RENDER THE STATUTE INOPERABLE.
Appellee Provo City has correctly noted that courts should rely on the plain

language of the statute. Courts should "assume that each term in the statute was used
advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." K & T, Inc. v. Korouis, 888 P.2d 623, 626-27
(Utah 1994) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). Provo City has asserted without
argument that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is unambiguous.

However, the

circumstances of this case and the comments of the District Court in its Ruling
demonstrate the opposite. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is ambiguous both in language
and in reasonable application.
In terms of language the statute does not define what constitutes 'abandoning] the
proceeding' nor does it articulate what would qualify as ccaus[ing] the action to be
dismissed.' These ambiguities are the precise reason this litigation has arisen. The statute
is unclear and court determination is required.
Moreover, in terms of reasonable application, the statute creates further confusion.
The interpretation of the statute advocated by Provo City creates perverse incentives for
condemning authorities and renders the statute both "unreasonably confused" and
"inoperable."

As the District Court noted, the reading of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16

advocated by Provo City "creates the danger a condemner will never voluntarily dismiss
its eminent domain case or move to dismiss the case but will always wait and make a
property owner make a motion to dismiss, even if the condemning entity brought the case
on improper legal grounds as happened here." (Record 839). In other words, the statute,
-3-

as interpreted by Provo City, is gutted of all practical application. No condemning
authority will voluntarily dismiss a case if voluntary dismissal will result in additional
costs and liability for attorneys' fees; such an interpretation renders the statute
inoperable, makes it so the condemning authority is able to dictate the outcome of the
action, and thus makes UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 meaningless. As the Koronis
indicates, if the result of an interpretation is to render a statute inoperable, literal
interpretation is not favored. Korouis, 888 P.2d at 626-27.
"But helpful as the rules of construction often are, they are
useful guides, but poor masters; and they should not be
regarded as having any rigidity as to have the force of law, or
distort an otherwise natural meaning of intent. Their only
legitimate function is to assist in ascertaining the true intent
and purpose of the statute. . . . An even more fundamental
rule of statutory interpretation helpful here is that the statute
should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with the
purpose which was sought to be accomplished."
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1977) (internal citations
omitted). Surely the intent of the statute is not to render itself inoperable. Rather, the
intent of the statute has already been articulated in Provo City v. Cropper. 497 P.2d at
630. The stated intent of the statute is to provide a recovery of attorneys' fees and costs
to those landowners who have been subjected to the legal expense of defense of a
condemnation, and who would otherwise have to bear the burden of these expenses if the
condemning authority subsequently abandoned the lawsuit because it was too expensive,
u

or for some other reason." Cropper, 497 P.2d at 630. Provo City's interpretation of the

statute does not accomplish this intent, and subsequently should be disregarded as
inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction for ambiguous statutes.
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III. PROVO CITY ABANDONED THE PROCEEDINGS.
Provo City abandoned these proceedings when its defense of the appeal failed and
when it took no further action in this matter for over two years. Consistent with the
definition of an ambiguous statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 does not define the term
'abandon.' Ironically, although Provo City asserts that UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is
unambiguous, Provo goes on to use dictionary terms to define the word 'abandon/
thereby admitting that the term is not clearly defined in the statute.
Furthermore, in attempting to define the term 'abandon' Provo City has asserted
that abandonment includes a voluntary element. Unfortunately, none of the definitions
cited by Provo City contain language which expressly or impliedly includes a voluntary
element. Provo City then goes on to analyze several extra-jurisdictional cases which,
based on substantially different statutes, address the issue of voluntary dismissal.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has already directly addressed the issue of voluntary
dismissal, and reference to extra-jurisdictional cases only distracts from Utah precedent.
In spite of Provo City's assertions, the present case has striking parallels to Provo
City v. Cropper, in which the Utah Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the same
statute in very similar circumstances. 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972). In Cropper,
Provo City (ironically the same plaintiff as in this case) sought to condemn land owned
by Cropper for use as a public park. Id. at 629. Five days before the trial, in a pretrial
hearing, Provo City verbally notified Cropper and the trial court that it had elected to not
proceed further with the action because the property was too costly. Id. The trial court,
based on the representations of Provo City struck the case from the court calendar but did
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not dismiss it. Id. Subsequently the trial court conducted a hearing on the matter of
attorneys' fees, dismissed the case on the courts own motion, and awarded Cropper his
costs and attorney's fees. Id. Provo City did not move to dismiss the case, and did not
voluntarily consent to the dismissal. Id. The precise issue on appeal in Cropper was
whether, after an involuntary dismissal on the court's own motion, attorneys' fees were
still due under the statute. The Cropper Court clearly held that they were. The Cropper
Court declined to insert a voluntary requirement into the statute, and instead focused on
the underlying intent of the statute.
It would appear that the provisions of the amendment as set
forth above were intended by the legislature to deal with the
practice of condemnors initiating proceedings to acquire
private property for public use and imposing upon the owners
the burdens of a trial or the preparation for a trial and then
abandoning the proceedings, when it appeared that the price
was too high, or for some other reason the condemnor elected
not to proceed further.
Id. at 630 (emphasis added). Provo City argued that because they had opposed the
dismissal of the case, and had not acted voluntarily to dismiss the case, that they had not
abandoned the proceedings nor had they caused the action to be dismissed. Id. The Utah
Supreme Court rejected this argument and chided Provo City, stating,
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff should not be
permitted to represent to the court that this action was to be
abandoned and dismissed for purpose of avoiding a trial and
thereafter to contend that the action is still pending for the
purpose of avoiding payment of expenses and attorney's fees.
Id. The Court also provided insight into the intent and underlying policy of the statute.
"It is our view that the statute was designed to correct a problem of unfairness in casting
a burden upon the owners of private property in this type of proceeding." Id. (emphasis
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added). Because Provo City failed to establish their authority to condemn outside the city
limits, Provo City's condemnation action was illegal. It is patently unfair to impose the
costs of defending and resisting the expropriation of one's own real property from an
illegal condemnation action.
Appellee Provo City focuses on the phrase "elected not to proceed" as used by
Cropper to indicate that there is a voluntary requirement. However, this phrase does not
create a voluntary requirement; rather it perfectly describes the actions of Appellee Provo
City in the present case. Provo City "elected not to proceed" in the present case for more
than two years before Appellants finally had to move for dismissal. That "election] not
to proceed" was an abandonment of the case.
Appellee Provo City also relies on the case of Cornish Town v. Roller. 817 P.2d
305 (Utah 1991). Provo City correctly points out that Roller held that both abandonment
and dismissal were required for an application of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16, and that
amendment of a complaint did not qualify as a dismissal. As to the first holding,
Appellants have always agreed that both abandonment and dismissal are required for the
statute to apply, and as to the issue of an amendment of a complaint, that does not apply
to the present fact scenario. In the present case we have two entirely distinct legal actions
involving entirely distinct parties. On the issue of abandonment as applied in the facts of
this case, Roller does not provide much guidance.
Appellee Provo City argues that it's behind the scenes involvement in Utah
County's condemnation of Appellants property somehow qualifies as not abandoning the
proceedings.

However, in the constitutional section of its argument Provo City argues

that the two actions (the present action and the subsequent action with Utah County) are
-7-

legally distinct and should not be considered jointly. (Appellees Brief, page 22, note 7).
Provo City cannot have it both ways. Appellants concede that the action between Provo
City and Appellants and the action between Utah County and Appellants are two legally
distinct actions, which are not related for the purposes of determining 'proceedings' as
used in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
Provo City asserts that it has acquired the Appellants' properties, but evidence for
this allegation is not found in the record. The property condemned by Utah County
remains Utah County property, not Provo City's. Section 6 of the Interlocal Cooperation
Agreement specifically requires that the property in question remain Utah County
property until Provo City annexes the property.

(Record 443). No annexation has

occurred and title remains with Utah County. The fact that the property remains with
Utah County indicates that the two actions are legally distinct, and reinforces the position
that Provo City abandoned this action to condemn Appellants' property. Provo City also
asserts that it has borne the costs of road construction on the property, and that Provo
City representatives have been involved in the decision making process with Utah
County. Again, these assertions are not supported by any evidence in the record and
neither assertion relates to the abandonment of this proceeding. Without further support
in the record, Provo City's allegations should be ignored. The facts that are in the record
clearly indicate that Provo City has abandoned this proceeding.
As it did in Cropper, Provo City in this case has again tried to avoid its
responsibility to pay Appellants' the attorneys' fees and expenses by the tactic of not
dismissing the case of its own volition, but rather allowing the case to languish while
Utah County brought an additional condemnation action. The failure of Provo City to do
-8-

anything affirmative regarding this case (resisting the appeal and moving to consolidate
were reactionary) demonstrates an abandonment of the proceedings.
IV.

PROVO CITY CAUSED THE ACTION TO BE DISMISSED.
In its argument that Provo City has not caused the action to be dismissed, Provo

City makes several important admissions. Provo City admits that it failed to "actively
pursue its condemnation" and it admits that "it need not have applied to the Court for
dismissal of the action in order to have caused the dismissal." (Appellee's Brief, page
16). When taken together, these admissions fully support Appellants argument that
Provo City caused the action to be dismissed. Provo admits that it failed to prosecute the
case, and that causing a dismissal must not necessarily include any affirmative action its
part. By failing to pursue the case for so long, Provo City placed the Appellants in a
serious quandary as to how to resolve the case, and through its inaction, caused the case
to be dismissed.
Provo City argues that it was simply waiting for the Utah County appeal to be
handed down before deciding on its next course of action. However, this representation
(which is unsupported by any evidence in the record) avoids the ruling made by the trial
court. The trial court specifically held that the case was dismissed because of Provo
City's failure to prosecute.

(Record 742).

Furthermore, Provo City's motion to

consolidate was filed only after Appellants had moved to dismiss, and was only
reactionary. (Record 582).
After the Utah Supreme Court handed down its decision in Provo City v. Ivie,
Provo City failed to take any action on the case for two years, and presumably, if
Appellants had not made a motion for attorneys' fees, would have been content to let the
-9-

case remain unresolved indefinitely. By not taking any action on this case for over two
years, Provo City forced Appellants to move for dismissal. Provo City caused the action
to be dismissed within the meaning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.
V.

BECAUSE THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN UTAH CODE. ANN. §
78-34-16 AND RULE 41(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS INCORRECT IN
ORDERING A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE.
Provo City argues that because the case was dismissed with prejudice, that the

statute cannot apply. Provo City fails to note that the dismissal with or without prejudice
is one of the issues raised in this appeal. Appellants are appealing the District Court's
ruling that attorneys' fees are not due under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 and that
includes the issue of whether this case should have been dismissed with or without
prejudice. This situation raises one of the significant "anomalies" noted by the trial court
in its ruling. As the facts of this particular case have revealed, there is a conflict between
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-34-16 and Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Provo City refused to dismiss the case voluntarily, and Appellants were forced to file for
dismissal themselves. As Rule 41(a) makes clear, voluntary dismissal can only be made
by the plaintiff or by motion of the court. Appellants only had the option of filing for
involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). Rule 41(b) indicates that any dismissal under
that section acts as an "adjudication upon the merits," or in other words a dismissal with
prejudice. This situation placed Appellants in a Catch-22 circumstance. They could not
get attorney fees until the case was dismissed, and the City failed to do so; and any
dismissal on Appellants own motion would, by rale, have to be a dismissal with
prejudice. Provo City has correctly determined how to exploit this statutory conflict by
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refusing to dismiss any condemnation on its own motion.

Condemning authorities can

circumvent the intent of the statute because of its ambiguous language, and render the
statute a practical nullity. Surely such a result was not intended when the statute was
passed. Appellees argue in footnote 5 that the case could have been dismissed without
prejudice by our motion, but it is clear that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide
for such a circumstance. When the defendant moves to dismiss, Rule 41 mandates that it
be with prejudice, thus creating the conundrum that Appellants found themselves in.
In spite of this problem, the Utah Supreme Court has delineated the policy under
which UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 must be interpreted. "[T]he statute is quite liberal in
covering every conceivable expense, damage, and cost in order to protect owners of
private property from an unfair burden when the condemnor elects to abandon the
action." Roller, 817 P.2d at 315. Without a recovery of attorneys' fees Appellants will
suffer the unfair burden that the statute is meant to prevent.
"[W]e are cognizant of the fact that we are not following the literal wording of the
statute, but such is not required when to do so would defeat legislative intent and make
the statute absurd." Johansen et ux. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98, 108 (Utah
1944). See also Robinson v. Union Pac. R. Co., 261 P. 9, 12 (Utah 1927).
"Allowance should be made for the fact that statutes are not
necessarily stated in general terms, and that often there is
neither the prescience to foresee, nor sufficient flexibility of
language to cover with exactitude, all of the exigencies of life
which may arise. For this reason one of the fundamental
rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be
looked at as a whole and in the light of the general purpose it
was intended to serve; and should be so interpreted and
applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give the
statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose,
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reason and intention sometimes prevail over technically
applied literalness."
Andrus v. Alfred, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah 1965) (internal citations omitted). See also
State Land Board v. State Department of Fish and Game, 408 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1965);
Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 445 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah
1968).
"The duty of this court in construing and interpreting
legislative acts is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.
In the exposition of a statute the intention of the law-maker
will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; and its reason
and intention will prevail over the strict letter. When the
words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the
context; from the occasion and necessity of law; from the
mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to
be taken or presumed according to what is consonant with
reason and good discretion." "We may then look to the reason
of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and
give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose,
sacrificing, if necessary, the literal meaning in order that the
purpose may not fail. When the intention of the legislature
can be gathered from the statute, words may be modified,
altered, or supplied to give to the enactment the force and
effect which the legislature intended."
Norville v. State Tax Commission, 97 P.2d 937, 939-40 (Utah 1940) (citations omitted).
Inasmuch as the literal language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 and the requirements of
Rule 41(b) are inconsistent with the underlying policy against unfairness, the Court
should modify the District Court's dismissal of the case to render it a dismissal without
prejudice.
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VI.

APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT QUALIFIES AS AN
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE THAT CAN BE RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, AND JUST COMPENSATION UNDER
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES.
A. The present situation qualifies as an 'exceptional circumstance' which
may appropriately be raised for the first time on appeal.
In its brief Provo City has correctly noted that Appellants raised the issue of the

right to reimbursement of attorneys' fees as a constitutional matter for the first time on
appeal. As a general rule, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Irwin, 924 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1996). There are, however, exceptions to this general
rule. If the appellant can establish that the trial court committed 'plain error' or if there
are 'exceptional circumstances/ then an issue may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Id.; State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). Appellants do not argue
that the trial court committed any plain error in this case. However, Appellants do assert
that this case represents exceptional circumstances.

"[The concept of exceptional

circumstances] is a safety device to make certain that manifest injustice does not result
from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." Arehambeau, 820 P.2d at 923; Irwin,
924 P.2d at 8. It is a "catch-all device." Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922-23. "The
exceptional circumstances rubric may be employed where a change in law or the settled
interpretation of law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex rel T.M.,
2003 UT App 191, 1J16, 73 P.3d 959 (internal quotation marks omitted). "With the
possible exception of an aberration or two, 'exceptional circumstances' is a concept that
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is used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional situations, for cases . . .
involving 'rare procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (internal citation omitted).
The present scenario falls squarely within the concept of exceptional
circumstances because it qualifies as a 'rare procedural anomaly.' In fact, the District
Court specifically noted the anomalous situation represented by this circumstance. It
states,
"As defendants correctly point out, the statute creates an
anomaly. If a condemning agency gets into a case and
decides it does not want to proceed because the price is too
high, it makes other plans or otherwise decides to request
dismissal of the action to avoid trial, it is liable for attorneys
[sic] fees. . . . The situation creates the danger a condemner
will never voluntarily dismiss its eminent domain case or
move to dismiss the case but will always wait and make a
property owner make a motion to dismiss, even if the
condemning entity brought the case on improper legal
grounds as happened here.... In addition, the anomaly in that
circumstance is heightened by the existence of 17B-4-1103 of
the Code which authorizes fees and costs if the property
owner gets a higher verdict than the sum offered by the
condemner. . . . So the anomalies are abundant in the statutory
scheme."
(Record 839). As the District Court correctly points out, the statutory scheme is so
anomalous that it raises serious questions over fairness. More than that, however, it
qualifies as a 'rare procedural anomaly' or 'exceptional circumstance' that merits
attention, even if raised for the first time on appeal. As has been articulated previously,
the Appellants have been forced into a difficult dilemma that has highlighted the
procedural ambiguity in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16.

A viable solution to this

procedural anomaly created by the statute is to address it under the provisions of the Utah
Constitution.

Because the situation raises unique state constitutional questions, and
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because it qualifies as a 'rare procedural anomaly/ it qualifies as an exceptional
circumstance that may appropriately be raised for the first time on appeal.
B. Just compensation under the Utah Constitution requires an award of
attorneys' fees.
Article L section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." (emphasis added).
Although attorneys' fees and costs are not embraced within the federal constitutional
interpretation of just compensation, this same principle does not carry over to the
corresponding state constitutional provisions. Both Colorado and Florida have held that
requiring an owner of real property to foot the legal bill for unsuccessful condemnation
attempts would not be 'just' within meaning of just compensation. See Denver Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Board of Co. Com 'rs, 98 P.2d 283, 287 (Colo. 1940); Dade County v.
Brigham, 47 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950). This Court favorably recognized this position in
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Daskalas, stating that this interpretation of
just compensation "appeals to a sense of fairness." 785 P.2d 1112, 1122-23 (Utah App.
1989).
Provo City argues that Appellants' constitutional argument fails for two reasons;
first, that no actual taking has occurred, and second that the Ferrebee case is controlling
on this issue. As to the first challenge, that no taking has occurred, Provo City has placed
itself in a logically inconsistent position. The main premise of Provo's challenge on the
abandonment prong of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is that although Provo City stopped
pursuing its own legal claim, the action by Provo City and the action by Utah County are
really the same proceeding. Provo City asserts that it has not really abandoned the
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proceedings because it has been behind the scenes in Utah County's condemnation
action. At the same time, under the state constitutional question, Provo City asserts that
the two actions are entirely separate and that legally the two cannot be considered jointly
for a determination of whether a taking has occurred.

These two positions are

irreconcilable. Either the two actions are legally separate or not. Appellants affirm that
the two actions are legally separate, consistent with Provo City's argument, but that a
taking still has occurred.
As outlined above, Provo City entered into the Interlocal Cooperation Agreement
eleven months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Provo City v. Ivie. (Record 449).
Provo had already formed the intent to bring multiple, legally separate actions against
Appellants with the effect of driving up legal expenses.

Such tactics violate the

fundamental principles of fairness which 'just compensation' is meant to protect.
Appellants have had to endure the financial burden of defending two separate
condemnation actions. Just compensation requires a condemning authority to place a
condemnation defendant "in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if
his property had not been taken." U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943); See also State
v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 43 (1957). By having to defend two separate lawsuits, Appellants
have paid a substantial amount of money in attorneys' fees, and are in no where near as
good a position pecuniarily as they would have been otherwise.
In Utah County v. Ivie, against these same defendants, the eminent domain statutes
do not require the condemning authority to pay attorneys' fees and costs because the Utah
County ultimately had authority to condemn, but in this case the Utah Supreme Court
held in Provo City v. Ivie that Provo City did not have authority to condemn. It is
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patently unfair to impose on Appellants the attorneys' fees and costs involved in
defending two separate condemnation lawsuits.
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that article I,
section 22 of the Utah Constitution is broader in its scope and in the protections it
affords. Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995). "Indeed, article L section
22 protects all property protected by its federal counterpart, and perhaps even more so
due to its more expansive language." Strawberry Elec. Service Dist. v. Spanish Fork
City, 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996); See also Bagford, 904 P.2d at 1097. Whether or
not a physical or regulatory taking has occurred in this action, the Appellants have
suffered injustice and monetary losses. Just compensation is the constitutional vehicle
designed to restore such losses. It is highly noteworthy that the Utah Constitution
contains an additional "or damaged" clause which clearly expands the reach and
protections of just compensation. Provo City has not disputed that the Appellants have
suffered damages in excess of $50,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, these damages are
directly compensable under article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.
As to Provo City's second point, that the Ferrebee case is controlling, this
argument is also incorrect.

Ferrebee addressed the question of whether relatively

minimal court costs and appraisal fees were compensable under the Utah Constitution in
a condemnation proceeding. Board of County Comm 'rs of Tooele County v. Ferrebee,
844 P.2d 308 (Utah 1992). The case did not address a circumstance of an abandonment
of the proceedings, as we have here. Furthermore, a careful reading of the case reveals
that although Ferrebee sought an award of attorneys' fees under statutory provisions, he
did not seek attorneys' fees under the Utah Constitution. The state constitutional claim
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was limited to costs and appraisal fees. Id. at 313-14. Therefore, Ferrebee is not
controlling as to attorneys' fees. Inasmuch as Ferrebee contains analysis which may
superficially appear to bear upon the present situation, Appellants urge the Court to
decline to follow such analysis, as it is inconsistent with the underlying policy of fairness
upon which just compensation is based, and as the history of this case demonstrates, it is
inconsistent with the fairness required when an abandonment of the proceedings has
occurred and Appellants have had to endure the severe burden of defending two separate
condemnation lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
Because the Utah State Legislature has enacted laws designed to prevent this
factual circumstance from ever arising again, this case presents minimal precedential
value, and consequently, this Court should focus on doing justice to the parties.
Moreover, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 is ambiguous both in terms of actual language,
and in reasonable application.

Statutory authority regarding the interpretation of

ambiguous statutes requires that a court should follow the intent of a statute. Provo City
v. Cropper and Cornish Town v. Roller articulate that the intent of the statute is to
broadly provide landowners with costs and attorneys' fees in the event of abandonment
and dismissal. Provo City's interpretation would thwart the underlying policy of the
statute and render it meaningless. By failing to take any action on this case for more than
two years Provo City abandoned the proceedings. By using delay tactics and by forcing
the case into an involuntary dismissal, Provo City has caused the action to be dismissed.
In addition, because of the conflicts between UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-16 and Rule
41(b) of the Utah Rules for Civil Procedure, this case should have been dismissed
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without prejudice in order to meet the requirements of the statute and in order to sustain
the underlying policy of fairness. Finally, regardless of the statute, the Utah Constitution
is broader in its scope and protections than the Federal Constitution. As both Colorado
and Florida have done, Utah should interpret just compensation to include a right to
reimbursement of expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees in this case.
DATED and SIGNED this / g c f e i y of March, 2008.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
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